In this paper, we intend to explain an empirical finding that distressed stocks delivered anomalously low returns. We show that in a model with heterogeneous investors where idiosyncratic skewness is priced, the expected return of risky assets depends on idiosyncratic coskewness betas, which measure the covariance between idiosyncratic variance and the market return. We find that there is a negative (positive) relation between idiosyncratic coskewness and equity returns when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive (negative). We construct two idiosyncratic coskewness factors to capture market-wide effect of idiosyncratic coskewness betas. When we control for these two idiosyncratic coskewness factors, the return difference for distress-sorted portfolios becomes insignificant. High stressed firms earn low returns because high stressed firms have high (low) idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive (negative).
Introduction
There has been considerable interest in understanding the relation between default-risk and equity returns in the finance literature. For example, Chan and Chen (1991) contend that the size effect is related to the presence of stressed firms in small stock portfolios. Similarly, Fama and French (1993) argue that a firm with a high book-to-market ratio is relatively stressed. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use the Merton (1974) model to compute default measures for individual firms and assess the effect of default risk on equity returns. They find that the size effect is a default effect, and this is also largely true for the book-to-market effect. However, recent empirical studies (Dichev (1998) , Griffin and Lemmon (2002) , Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) ) document a negative relationship between default risk and realized stock returns. In addition, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find that correcting for risk using the standard risk factors worsens the anomaly.
In the credit risk literature, an empirical study by Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2008) finds that the volatility and jump risks of individual firms identified from high-frequency equity prices can predict about 50% of the variation in default risk, measured by credit default swap spreads. The jump risk alone forecasts about 20%. Since jumps affect higher moments of equity returns, their findings suggest a relationship between default risk and higher moments of equity returns. In addition, numerous papers (see Odean (1999), and Polkovnichenko (2005) ) have documented that investors commonly do not hold well diversified portfolios.
Given the lack of diversification in investor holdings, investors will care about the level of idiosyncratic skewness in their portfolio returns. Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) , Barberis and Huang (2008) and Mitton and Vorkink (2008) provide theoretical models to show that idiosyncratic skewness is priced in equilibrium. More recently, Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009) document an empirical evidence that stocks with high expected idiosyncratic skewness have on average low returns. Because lagged skewness alone does not adequately forecast skewness, they regress time t+1 idiosyncratic skewness on time t predictor variables, and use the expected skewness as their measure of expected idiosyncratic skewness.
In this paper, we intend to examine the relationship between expected equity returns and another measure of idiosyncratic higher moments (hereafter idiosyncratic coskewness), and provide a possible explanation to the seemingly anomalous finding that high stressed firms earn low equity returns. There are several contributions of this paper.
First, we show that in a model in which there are heterogeneous investors who may care about the skewness of their portfolios, the expected return on risky assets depends on idiosyncratic coskewness betas, which measures the covariance between idiosyncratic variance and the market return. In addition, there is a negative (positive) relationship between idiosyncratic skewness and equity returns when the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is positive (negative).
Second, we test this prediction using equity returns. When estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive, there is a negative relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas. When estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative, the relationship becomes positive. In addition, when we control for risk using the market factor, the Fama-French three factors, and the Carhart four factors, the relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas becomes stronger. In other words, the standard risk factors cannot explain why portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness betas earn high excess returns when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive, and why portfolios with high idiosyncratic coskewness betas earn high excess returns when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative. We form two long-short portfolios, which long the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and short the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta for both groups with positive and negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas, to capture the systematic variation in excess portfolio returns sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas. We call them idiosyncratic coskewness factors, ICSK 1 for the groups with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and ICSK 2 for the groups with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas. The average monthly excess returns for ICSK 1 and ICSK 2 over the sample period January 1971 to December 2006 are 0.61% (t = 1.76) and -0.76% (t = 2.16) respectively.
Third, we show that the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors can explain the anomalous finding that high stressed firms earn low equity returns. As documented in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) , the individual skewness is almost a monotonic function of their distress measure. We show that in an economy where investors have heterogeneous preferences, the equilibrium expected excess return depends on excess market return, idiosyncratic skewness, and idiosyncratic coskewness betas. We use Merton (1974) model to measure default risk for individual firms, and find the anomalous negative relation between default risk and equity returns. When we regress distress-sorted portfolio returns on the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors ICSK 1 and ICSK 2 , we find that factor loadings on ICSK 1 are generally declining with distress measures, and factor loadings on ICSK 2 are generally increasing with distress measures. The two idiosyncratic coskewness factors reduce the monthly excess return of a long-short portfolio holding the portfolio with the lowest distress measure and shorting the portfolio with the highest distress measure from 1.42% to 0.65%.
Including other standard risk factors, such as the market, size, value, and momentum factors, will not significantly alter the factors loadings on the two idiosyncratic factors and the alpha of the long-short portfolio.
Our paper is one of several recent papers that intend to explain the anomalous finding that high stressed firms earn low equity returns. Garlappi and Yan (2008) show that in a model that considers the bargaining game between equity-holders and debt-holders, equity returns depend on a measure of "shareholder advantage ". When shareholder advantage is strong, the relation between default probability and equity returns is humped and downward sloping. When shareholder advantage is weak, the relation is upward sloping. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007a) show that the negative relationship between credit risk and average equity returns exist only during credit rating downgrade periods and is attributable to low-rated firms that experience considerable negative returns during the 1-year period around downgrades. Given the high return volatility of high stressed portfolios, Chava and Purnanandam (2008) argue against using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns. They use implied cost of capital computed from analysts forecasts as a measure of ex-ante expected returns. They find a significant positive relation between default risk and realized returns during the pre-1980 period. The negative relation between default risk and equity returns is a surprise to investors during the post-1980 period. Chen and Zhang (2008) propose a new three-factor model consists of the market factor and common factors based on investment and returns on asset. Their model can explain many empirical findings in finance, such as the positive relations of average returns with short-term prior returns and earnings surprises as well as the negative relations of average returns with financial distress, net stock issues, and asset growth. High stressed firms usually experience considerable negative returns in the past. It is no surprise that their model can explain the negative relation between default risk and equity returns since one of their factors is based on past equity returns.
Our paper provides an alternative explanation for the negative relation between default risk and equity returns. We show that high stressed firms earn low equity returns because of the contribution of their idiosyncratic coskewness. For firms with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas, high stressed firms have low idiosyncratic coskewness betas. In contrast, for firms with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas, high stressed firms have high idiosyncratic coskewness betas. These relations contribute to low equity returns for high stress firms because there is a negative relation between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas for firms with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and there is a positive relation between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas for firms with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both theoretical and empirical relation between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and equity returns. Section 3 describes our measure of default risk based on Merton's (1974) model and the anomalous negative relation between default risk and equity returns. Section 4 examines the relation between default risk and idiosyncratic coskewness factors. Section 5 concludes.
Idiosyncratic Coskewness and Equity Returns

Theory
Many empirical papers have documented that investors usually hold under-diversified portfolios with a small number of securities. One possible explanation is that investors care about idiosyncratic skewness in their portfolios. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that idiosyncratic skewness is priced in equilibrium under the assumption that investors have preferences based on cumulative prospect theory. Mitton and Vorkink (2008) demonstrate the same result under the assumption of heterogeneous preference for skewness. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) report average skewness of individual returns for distress-sorted portfolios in Table VI of their paper. The result shows that average skewness of individual returns are almost monotonically increasing with default risk. In other words, high defaultrisk stocks have high idiosyncratic skewness. We intend to examine the relationship between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness in a linear asset pricing model, and investigate empirically if investors' preference for skewness can explain the anomaly that high distressed firms earn low returns.
In our model, we follow Mitton and Vorkink (2008) and assume that the universe of stocks consists of two assets and a risk-free asset. The return vector of the two securities is
The covariance of asset returns is denoted Σ.
In our economy, we assume that there are two investors, a "traditional "investor and a "Lotto investor ". The traditional investor utility can be approximated as a standard quadratic utility function over wealth
where W is the investor terminal wealth, τ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion. ? and Hlawitschka (1994) show that the quadratic utility is a reasonable approximation of standard expected utility functions. And it seems reasonable to assume that in the population the traditional investor behave as a mean-variance investor. The "Lotto investor "has the same preferences as the traditional investor over mean and variance, but also has preference for skewness
where φ is the investor skewness preference. As shown in Cass and Stiglitz (1970) , utilities (1) and (2) can lead, under certain restrictions, to equilibrium portfolio separation. As φ −→ ∞, the Lotto investor utility approaches the traditional investor utility as in Markowitz (1959) .
It is insightful to notice that if all investors are lotto investors, then the model would be reduced to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) coskewness model. Each investor maximizes (1) and (2) subject to his budget constrain of the form
where R f is the return on the risk-free asset, R − R f 1 is the excess return, and ω i is the asset demand. For the traditional (hereafter T ) investor, the First-order conditions of (1) gives
For Lotto investors (hereafter L), the First-order conditions can be simplified to
Since the economy should generate the same expected excess return regardless of investor preferences, the expected excess returns in (3) and (4) have to be identical. This allows us to write the equilibrium expected excess return as
Notice that ω L + ω T represents the aggregate demand in this economy, hence (ω L + ω T )
T R can be treated as the return on the market portfolio. Finally, the equilibrium expected excess return on the risky asset is
Equation (5) is not the coskewness model put forward in Harvey and Siddique (2000) nor the coskewness model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) .
denotes the asset one idiosyncratic skewness. The expected excess return on the risky asset (5) is
where
,
The expected excess return depends on the standard CAPM beta, β CAP M , the coskewness beta as defined in Harvey and Siddique (2000) , β CSK , the idiosyncratic coskewness beta, β ICSK , and the idiosyncratic skewness as defined in Mitton and Vorkink (2008) . As φ −→ ∞, the expected excess return on the risky asset reduces to the risk premium in the CAPM model.
The impact of the standard CAPM beta, the coskewness beta, and the expected idiosyncratic skewness on asset returns is consistent with theoretical predictions since λ M is positive, and λ CSK and λ ISK are negative. However, the impact of the idiosyncratic coskewness beta on asset returns need to be clarified because λ ICSK can be positive and negative, depending on whether the lotto investor buys or sells the risky asset. Our model set up is similar to Mitton and Vorkink (2008) , but the outcome is different from Mitton and Vorkink (2008) because we relax the assumption that the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is not zero. To isolate the effect of idiosyncratic skewness on excess return, Mitton and Vorkink (2008) assume that the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is zero.
To investigate the relation between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and expected returns we consider two assets and form a portfolio of these two assets by changing the weight on these assets from -1 to 1. We then study the return difference between the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta. To perform our analysis, we fix the returns of the two assets and their idiosyncratic coskewness betas. The top left graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between the portfolio idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the expected return when the idiosyncratic coskewness betas for both assets are positive. SET1=(0.06,0.01,0.005,0.009) contains the expected returns, and idiosyncratic coskewness betas of the two assets respectively. As shown in this graph, the difference in expected returns between the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta is negative. For a different set of values, SET1=(0.06,0.01,0.009,0.006), we reach the same conclusion in the top left graph in Figure 2 .
The bottom right graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and expected returns when the idiosyncratic coskewness betas for both assets are negative. SET4=(0.06,0.01,-0.005,-0.009) contains the expected returns, and idiosyncratic coskewness betas of the two assets respectively. As shown in this graph, the difference in expected returns between the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta is positive. For a different set of values, SET4=(0.06,0.01,-0.009,-0.005), we reach the same conclusion in the bottom right graph in Figure 2 .
The top right graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and expected returns when asset one has negative idiosyncratic coskewness beta and asset two has positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta, SET3=(0.06,0.01,-0.005,0.009). The bottom left graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and expected returns when asset one has positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta and asset two has negative idiosyncratic coskewness beta, SET3=(0.06,0.01,0.005,-0.009). As shown in these graphs, there is no a clear relationship between the portfolio idiosyncratic coskewness beta and its expected return. We reach the same conclusion in the top right and bottom left graphs in Figure 2 . This suggests that, when all assets are used regardless of the sign of their idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas is "hump-shaped".
Equity Returns and Measures of Higher Moments Risk
In this section, we use the entire CRSP equity data to investigate the relationship between equity returns and coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively. At the beginning of each month, we use past 12-month daily data on individual stock returns to compute coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively as defined in the previous section, and form portfolios sorted by coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively. To reduce the liquidity effect on equity returns, we eliminate firms with no transaction days larger than 120. We also eliminate stocks with prices less than $1 at the end of a month. Following the same method used to compute returns for distress-sorted portfolios, we compute value-weighted returns for portfolios sorted by coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively.
Tables 1 reports the results for the decile portfolios sorted by coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively. For the ten portfolios sorted by coskewness betas, there is a slight negative relation between excess equity returns and coskewness betas, which is consistent with Harvey and Siddique (2000) . However, the relationship almost disappears when we control for the Fama-French factors. In addition, the relationship becomes positive when we control the Carhart four factors. For the ten portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the relationship between excess equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas is hump-shaped, i.e. portfolios with both lowest and highest idiosyncratic coskewness betas have lower excess returns than the others. This hump-shaped relationship does not disappear even when we control the market factor, the Fama-French factors, or the Carhart factors. This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction. For the ten portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic skewness, there is a slight positive relation between excess equity returns and idiosyncratic skewness. However, this relationship basically disappear when we control the standard risk factors, such as the market factor, the Fama-French factors, or the Carhart factors. Table 1 confirms our theoretical finding our measure of idiosyncratic coskewness is different from the standard coskewness and idiosyncratic skewness measure. It is important to point out that empirically testing the relation between idiosyncratic skewness and returns is not a straightforward exercise. The primary obstacle is that ex ante skewness is difficult to measure. As opposed to variances and covariances, idiosyncratic skewness is not stable over time. This explains the marginal effect of idiosyncratic skewness on expected returns
To further investigate the cross-sectional relation between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic skewness, we run a simple OLS regression of idiosyncratic coskewness 1 To avoid this obstacle, Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009) regress idiosyncratic skeweness on a set of predictor variables and use the expected component of their linear regression as a measure of expected idiosyncratic skewness. Because the goal of this paper is to investigate whether idiosyncratic coskewness betas explain the default risk puzzle, we do not investigate the empirical relationship between expected idiosyncratic skewness and expected idiosyncratic coskewness. We leave this issue for future research. 
Equity Returns Sorted by Positive and Negative Idiosyncratic Coskewness
We show in the last section that there is a hump-shaped relation between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas. To further investigate that relationship, we divide firms into two groups according to the sign of their idiosyncratic coskewness betas. For each group, we then rank the stocks based on their past idiosyncratic coskewness betas and form ten value-weighted decile portfolios. Following the same method used to compute returns for distress-sorted portfolios, we compute value-weighted returns for idiosyncratic coskewness beta-sorted portfolios in each groups. Tables 2 and 3 report the results for ten portfolios with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas and ten portfolios with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas respectively. Panel A reports average excess returns, in monthly percentage points, of idiosyncratic coskewness beta-sorted portfolios and the average return of a long-short-portfolio holding the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorting the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta. Panel A also reports alphas with respective to the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) The average excess returns for the first nine portfolios with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas are almost flat. The average excess return for the tenth portfolio, which has the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, is much lower than those for the other nine portfolios. The average return for the long-short-portfolio which goes long the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and short the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta is 0.81% with a t-statistic of 1.87. The results weakly support the prediction that excess returns decline with idiosyncratic coskewness betas rising when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive.
There is also an interesting pattern in estimated factor loadings reported in Table 2 .
Portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness betas have low loadings on the market factor, negative loadings on the size factor SMB, and positive loadings on the value factor HML.
Portfolios with high idiosyncratic coskewness betas have high loadings on the market factor, positive and high loadings on the size factor SMB, and negative loadings on the value factor HML. There is no clear pattern in the estimated factor loadings for the momentum factor
UMD.
These factor loadings implies that when we correct risk using the market factor or the Fama-French three factors, we will not be able to explain why the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta has such low excess returns compared to the other nine portfolios. On the contrary, it will worsen the anomaly. In fact, alphas in the regressions with respect to the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model are almost monotonic declining with idiosyncratic coskewness betas increasing. A long-short portfolio that holds the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorts the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta has a CAPM alpha of 1.21% with a t-statistic of 3.14; it has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 1.12% with a t-statistic of 4.29; and it has a Carhart four-factor alpha of 0.98% with a t-statistic of 4.02. When we correct risk using the standard factors, we find stronger evidence to support the prediction that there is a negative relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative.
For the ten portfolios with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the average excess returns reported in Table 3 are almost monotonically increasing with idiosyncratic coskewness betas. It is consistent with the prediction that there is a positive relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative.
A long-short portfolio that holds the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorts the portfolio with the highest coskewness beta has an excess return of -0.63% with a t-statistic of 2.00.
There is a clear pattern in estimated factor loadings for the market factor and the size factor SMB in the four-factor regression. Portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness betas have high loadings on the market factor and the size factor SMB. Portfolios with high idiosyncratic coskewness betas have low loadings on the market factor and the size factor SMB. There is no clear pattern in estimated factor loadings for the value factor HML and the momentum factor UMD. These loading implies that when we cannot explain the return difference using the standard risky factors. In fact, controlling those factors increases return difference for portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas. The same long-short portfolio has a CAPM alpha of -0.88% with a t-statistic of 2.74; it has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of -0.85% with a t-statistic of 3.76; and it has a Carhart four-factor alpha of -0.61% with a t-statistic of 2.48.
In summary, the empirical results support that the relationship between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas is positive when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative, and negative when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive. In addition, we find that the return difference between portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas, with either positive or negative values, cannot be explained by the standard risk factors, such as the market factor, the size factor, the value factor, and the momentum factor. In the next section, we will examine the relationship between default risk and idiosyncratic coskewness.
Idiosyncratic Coskewness Factors
We investigate two value-weighted hedge portfolios that capture the effect of idiosyncratic coskewness. As discussed in the previous section, at the beginning of each month, we use past 12 month daily equity returns to estimate idiosyncratic coskewness beta for each individual firm. We first divide firms into two groups according to the sign of the estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas, then we form value-weighted decile portfolios based estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas for both groups. We compute the excess portfolio returns in the following month (i.e. post-ranking). We construct the long-short portfolio holding the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorting the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta. The long-short portfolio in the group with negative idiosyncratic coskewness beta is called ICSK 1 , and the long-short portfolio in the group with positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta is called ICSK 2 . We use ICSK 1 and ICSK 2 to proxy for idiosyncratic coskewness factors.
The average monthly excess returns for ICSK 1 and ICSK 2 are 0.81% and -0.63% respectively over the period January 1971 to December 2006. We reject the hypothesis that the mean excess return for factor ICSK 2 is zero at the 5 percent level of significance. But we cannot reject the same hypothesis for factor ICSK 1 . A high factor loading on ICSK 1 should be associated with high expected excess returns. In contrast, for factor ICSK 2 , a high factor loading should be associated with low expected excess returns.
Can Idiosyncratic Coskewness Factors Explain What Other Risk Factors Do Not?
The failures of the CAPM model often appear in specific groups of securities that are formed on size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. To understand how idiosyncratic coskewness factors enter asset pricing, we analyze the pricing errors from other asset pricing models such as the Fama-French three-factor model, and the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) .
We carry out time-series regression of excess returns,
and jointly test whether the intercepts, α i , are different from zero using the F-test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) where
We test the Fama-French three factor model and Carhart four-factor model for industrial portfolios, decil portfolios sorted by size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum, and decil portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness beta. The results are presented in Table 4 . When we test 10 portfolios sorted by the book-to-market ratio, the inclusion of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors reduces can explain a significant part of the variation in returns even when factors based on size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum are added to the asset pricing model.
Measuring Default Probability
Merton's Model
In the default risk literature, there are two approaches to measure default risk, the reducedform and structural approaches. A reduced-form model provides the maximum likelihood estimates of a firm's default probability based on the empirical frequency of default and its correlation with various firm characteristics. A structural model provides estimated default probability which is theoretically motivated by the classical option-pricing models (Merton (1974) future performance. Therefore, they are better suited for measuring the probability that a firm may default in the future. In this paper, we use Merton's (1974) model to estimate the default probability of a firm. In Merton's model, the equity of a firm is viewed as a call option on the value of firm's assets. The firm will default when the value of the firm falls below a strike price, which is measured as the book value of firm's liabilities. The firm value
is not observable and is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion of the form:
where V A is the value of firm's assets, with an instantaneous drift µ A , and an instantaneous volatility σ A . W is the standard Wiener process.
Let X t denote the book value of firm's liabilities at time t, which has a maturity at time T . The value of equity is given by the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for call options:
r is the risk-free interest rate, and N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
Using daily equity data from the past 12 months, we adopt a maximum likelihood method developed by Duan (1998) to obtain an estimate of the volatility of firm value σ A . Duan (1998) computes the likelihood function of equity returns by utilizing the conditional density of the unobservable firm value process. We repeat the estimation procedure at the end of every month, resulting in monthly estimates of the volatility σ A . We always keep the estimation window to 12 months.
With an estimated σ A , we can calculate daily values of V A for the last 12 months, and then estimate the drift µ A . At the end of every month t, the probability of default implied by Merton's model is given by:
The P def,t calculated from equation (11) does not correspond to the true default probability of a firm in large samples since we do not use data on actual defaults. However, we use our measures to study the relationship between default risk and equity returns. The difference between our measure of default probability and true default probability may not be important as long as our measure correctly ranks firms according to their true default probability.
Data
One important parameter in Merton's model is the strike price, i.e. the book value of debt. Most firms have both long-term and short-term debts. Following KMV, we calculate the book value of debt by using short-term debt plus half long-term debt. We use the COMPUSTAT annual files to obtain the firm's "Debt in One Year" and "Long-Term Debt" series for all firms. Since debt data was not available for many firms before 1970, the sample period in our study is January 1971 to December 2006. In addition, financial firms have very different capital structure than industrial firms. We exclude all financial firms (SIC codes: 6000-6999). We also exclude all utility firms (SIC codes: 4900-4999) because many utility firms were highly regulated during our sample period. We use only industrial firms (SIC codes: 1-3999 and 5000-5999) in this studies since they are more suitable for Merton's model. We obtain all industrial firms with data available simultaneously on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases.
We obtain the book value of debt from the COMPUSTAT annual files. To avoid the problem of delayed reporting, we lag the book value of debt by 3 months. This is to ensure that our default probability measure is based on all information available to investors at the time of calculation.
To compute the default likelihood measure, we obtain daily equity values for firms from CRSP daily files, and the risk-free interest rate from the Fama-Bliss discount bond file. We use monthly observations of the 1-year Treasury bill rate and equity data for the past 12 months to calculate monthly default measures for all firms.
When a firm is in sever financial distress, its equity is not liquid with low prices. To minimize liquidity effects on equity returns, we eliminate stocks with prices less than $1 at the portfolio construction date, and stocks with less than 120 transactions in the past 12 months. In the end, we have 10,078 firms with more than 3.5 million monthly observations in the sample. Figure 6 plots the average default probability for industrial firms during the sample period. The shaded areas represent the NBER recession periods. The graph shows that the average default probability varies greatly and it usually peaks during recessions.
Measuring Performance of Merton's Model
To test the performance of Merton's model in predicting bankruptcy and other distress in our sample, we construct two measures based on exchange delisting as proxies for bankruptcy.
One is a narrower measure of distress, called bankruptcy delisting (delisting codes: 400, 572, 574). The other is a broader measure of distress, called performance delisting (delisting codes: 400, 550 to 585). The second measure includes delisting due to not only bankruptcy and liquidation but also insufficient number of market makers, insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity, price too low, delinquent in filing, etc. All the delisting data are obtained from CRSP.
To evaluate the predictive ability of our default measure to capture default risk, we sort firms according to their estimated default probability based on past 12-month equity data.
At the end of each month from January 1971 through December 2006, default probability is re-estimated using only historical data to avoid look-ahead bias. To pay greater attention to the tail of default risk distribution, we follow Campbell et. al. and construct 10 portfolios containing stocks in percentiles 0-5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-99 , and 99-100 (P1 and P10 denote the portfolios with the lowest and the highest default probability respectively). In the following month, we then collect the number of bankruptcy and performance delistings for each portfolio. The summary results are reported in Table 5 .
The evidence shows that the default risk measure based on Merton's model is a good ex ante measure of probability of bankruptcy and other distress. The number of bankruptcy and performance delistings generally increases with default risk measures from Merton's model.
During the sample period, 46 out of 60 delistings due to bankruptcy and liquidation, and 213 out of 443 delistings due to performance come from the two portfolios with highest default measures. These two portfolios contains the highest-risk 5% of stocks.
Equity Returns on Distressed Stocks
We now examine the relationship between the likelihood of default and equity returns. Fama and French (1996) and others have argued that financial stress may explain the size and value premiums in equity returns. Vassalou and Xing (2004) provide some supporting evidences.
This conjecture, however, has proven difficult to reconcile with other empirical findings by Dichev (1998) those firms from portfolios. This assumes that those stocks are sold at the end of the month before delisting, which implies an upward bias to the returns for distressed-stock portfolios (Shumway (1997) ). Table 6 reports the summary statistics of equity returns on the ten distress-sorted portfolios. The average returns are declining in general with default measures increasing. The average return is 0.92% for the portfolio with the lowest default risk, and it is -0.51% for the portfolio with the highest default risk. The volatilities of returns are increasing with default measures. The standard deviation of returns is 4.48% for the portfolio with the lowest default risk, and it is 14.95% for the portfolio with the highest default risk. In addition, returns on portfolios with low default measures exhibit negative skewness, and returns on portfolio with high default measures exhibit positive skewness. There is no clear pattern in the kurtosis of returns. Table 6 also reports the unconditional coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness of the ten distress-sorted portfolios. There is no clear pattern in the coskewness betas. Howeve, both idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic skewness are in general increasing with default measures. The average size of firms in the ten portfolios is monotonically declining with default measures increasing. It suggests that controlling size risk factor will not explain the puzzling negative relation between equity returns and default risk.
A possible explanation for the negative relation between equity returns and default measures is that the default measure is just a proxy for other systematic risk factors. We test this hypothesis with regressions. Table 8 reports the regression results. Panel A reports the excess returns of ten distress-sorted portfolios and a long-short-portfolio that goes long the portfolio with the lowest default risk, and short the portfolio with the highest default risk.
Panel A also reports the alphas in regressions of the portfolio excess returns on the CAPM factor, Fama-French three factors, and four factors proposed by Carhart (1997) The average excess returns of the 10 stress-sorted portfolios reported in Table 8 are in general declining in the default risk measure. The average excess return for the lowest-risk 5% of stocks is positive at 0.43% per month, and the average excess return for the highestrisk 1% of stocks is negative at -0.99% per month. A long-short portfolio that goes long the safest 5% of stocks, and short the most distressed 1% of stocks has an average return of 1.42% per month with a standard deviation of 14%. It implies a Sharp ratio of 0.10.
There is also a significant pattern on the factor loadings reported in Table 8 . The low risk portfolios in general have smaller market betas, negative loadings on the size factor SMB, and negative loadings on the value factor HML. On the contrary, the high risk portfolios in general have bigger market betas, positive loadings on the size factor SMB, and positive loadings on the value factor HML. The results reflect the fact that most distressed stocks are small stocks with high book-to-market ratios. It implies that correcting risk using the market factor or Fama-French factors will not solve the anomaly but worsen it. In fact, the long-short portfolio longing the safest 5% of stocks, and shorting the most distressed 1% of stocks has a CAPM alpha of 1.94% per month with a t-statistic of 3.16. It has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 2.76% per month with a t-statistic of 4.90. In addition, the Fama-French three-factor alphas for all portfolios beyond 40th percentile of the default risk distribution are negative and statistically significant. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007b) find a robust link between credit rating and momentum. They find that momentum profit exists only in low-grade firms. Distressed firms have negative momentum, which may explain their low average returns. When we correct for risk by using Carhart (1997) four-factor model including a momentum factor, the low risk portfolios in general have low and positive loadings on the momentum factor.
The high risk portfolios have high and negative loadings on the momentum factor. After controlling for the momentum factor, we find that the alpha for the long-short portfolio is cut almost in half, from 2.76% per month to 1.38% per month, which is still statistically significant.
Explaining Equity Return Anomaly for Distressed Firms
Default Risk and Idiosyncratic Coskewness
We have demonstrated that in a model with heterogeneous investors who care about the skewness of their portfolios, the expected return of risky assets depends on their coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic skewness. To capture the effect of coskewness on cross-sectional equity returns, we construct a value-weighted hedge portfolio, i.e. the coskewness factor, holding the portfolio with the lowest coskewness beta and shorting the portfolio with the highest coskewness beta. In a similar fashion, we also construct a hedge portfolio, i.e. the idiosyncratic skewness factor, to capture the effect of idiosyncratic skewness.
We have shown that the standard risk factors, such as the market factor, the Fama-French factors, and the Carhart four risk factors, cannot explain why high distressed firms earn low equity returns. In our model, expected equity returns depends on not only their CAPM betas, but also their coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic skewness. We investigate if coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas or idiosyncratic skewness can help explain anomaly. We first run simple regression of returns of distress-sorted portfolios on the market factor, the coskewness factor, the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors, and the idiosyncratic skewness factor respectively. The results presented in 8 show that the equity return anomaly for distressed firms still exists when we control either the market factor, the coskewness factor, or the idiosyncratic skewness factor. The monthly return difference between portfolios with the lowest and highest default probabilities is 1.94%, 1.41%, and 1.66% respectively when we control for the market factor, the coskewness factor, and the idiosyncratic skewness factor. The return differences are statistically significant at 5% level. However, the monthly return difference between portfolios with the lowest and highest default probabilities is 0.73% and 0.89% respectively when we control for the positive and negative idiosyncratic coskewness factors. The return differences are not statistically significant at 5% level.
The simple regression results show that either positive or negative idiosyncratic coskewness factors can at least partially explain why equity returns are low for high distressed firms. High distressed firms will earn low equity returns if they have negative loadings on the positive idiosyncratic coskewness factor and positive loadings on the negative idiosyncratic coskewness factor. We will further test this hypothesis by regressing distress-sorted portfolio returns on two idiosyncratic coskewness factors, ICSK 1 and ICSK 2 . We will also test the robustness of our results by including other risk factors, such as the Fama-French factors and the momentum factor, in the regressions. The regression results are reported in Table 9 .
When we regress excess returns for distress-sorted portfolios on the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors, we find a striking variations in factor loadings across portfolios. The fac-tor loadings for factor ICSK 1 are almost monotonically declining with default risk increasing.
In contrast, the factor loadings for factor ICSK 2 are almost monotonically increasing with default risk. The portfolio with the highest default risk has negative loadings on factor ICSK 1 and positive loadings on ICSK 2 . They are both statistically significant at 1% level. Since a positive loading on factor ICSK 1 and a negative loading on ICSK 2 will reduce expected excess return. Controlling for the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors help explain the equity return anomaly for distressed firms. The same result can be found in the regression of excess returns for a long-short portfolio holding the safest portfolio and shorting the most risky portfolio on the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors. The factor loading is positive for factor ICSK 1 and negative for factor ICSK 2 . Both loadings are statistically significant. Controlling for the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors cuts alphas for the long-short portfolio roughly in half, from 1.42% to 0.64%, and it is not statistically significant.
To examine robustness of our findings, we include four standard risk factors (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD)in the regression. For the ten distress-sorted portfolios and the long-short portfolio, the factor loadings on the two idiosyncratic coskewness remain similar. Alpha for the long-short portfolio is 0.73% with a t-statistic of 1.11.
The results show that the explanatory power of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors is large for firms on both tails of the distribution of distress measures. The adjusted R 2 in the regression of returns of the long-short portfolio based on default measures on the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors is 28%. The negative loading on ICSK 1 and positive loading on ICSK 2 help reduce the alpha for the long-short portfolio based on distress measures.
Conclusion
We build a theoretical model of heterogeneous skewness preference that leads to asset-pricing relationships, in addition to equity, that differ from the standard CAPM model. We show that the expected excess return on a skewed security depends on four terms. The first term is the standard risk premium in the CAPM model, the second term is the asset's coskewness premium put forward in Harvey and Siddique (2000) , the third term is the idiosyncratic coskewness betas which measures the covariance of the squared idiosyncratic shock and the market return. The last term represents the asset idiosyncratic skewness. When the asset's idiosyncratic coskewness is zero, the model reduces to Mitton and Vorkink (2008) .
We empirically show that in addition to the well known idiosyncratic skewness, the idiosyncratic coskewness measure is also an important determinant for asset returns, and provide a rational explanation on the seemingly anomalous negative relation between default risk and equity returns. Although a number of theories point toward a lower return for stocks with default risk, empirical testing of the relation between default risk and measures of idiosyncratic skewness has been slow in coming. We attempt to fill this void by estimating a model of idiosyncratic coskewness and then using idiosyncratic coskewness to explain the negative relation between default risk and equity returns.
We find a negative (negative) relation between expected equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive (negative). We then construct two idiosyncratic coskewness factors to capture time series variations of equity returns sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas. We find that the standard market, size, value and momentum factors cannot explain the excess returns of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors.
These two idiosyncratic coskewness factors can explain a large variation of distress-sorted portfolio returns. High stressed firms earn low returns because high stressed firms have high idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive, and high stressed firms have low idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative. Also noteworthy is that our measure of idiosyncratic coskewness cannot be explain by the idiosyncratic skewness, this suggests that both idiosyncratic skewness and idiosyncratic coskewness measures different higher moment risks. We sort stocks based on estimated coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively, and divide them into 10 decile portfolios. 0010 denotes the portfolio with the lowest coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, or idiosyncratic skewness, i.e. the 0-10 percentile, and 9900 denotes the portfolio with the highest coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, or idiosyncratic skewness, i.e. the 90-100 percentile. The hedge portfolio that longs 0010 and shorts 9000 is denoted by LS1090. This table reports We sort stocks based on estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas which have positive values, and divide them into 10 decile portfolios. 0010 denotes the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, i.e. the 0-10 percentile, and 9900 denotes the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, i.e. the 90-100 percentile. The hedge portfolio that longs 0010 and shorts 9000 is denoted by LS1090. This We sort stocks based on estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas which have negative values, and divide them into 10 decile portfolios. 0010 denotes the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, i.e. the 0-10 percentile, and 9900 denotes the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, i.e. the 90-100 percentile. The hedge portfolio that longs 0010 and shorts 9000 is denoted by LS1090. This This table reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of monthly returns, in percentage points, on ten distress-sorted portfolios. It also reports unconditional coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness of the ten portfolios, as well as the average size, in million dollars, of firms in each portfolio. At the end of each month firms are assigned into portfolios according to their probability of default measures. We construct 10 portfolios containing stocks in percentiles 0-5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-99 , and 99-100 of the distribution of the default measure. Portfolio 1 contains firms with the lowest default probability measure. We sort all stocks on the predicted default probability from Merton's Model and divide them into 10 portfolios on percentile cutoffs. The ten portfolios containing stocks in percentiles 0-5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-99 , and 99-100 of the distribution of the default measure. The portfolio contains the 0 to 5th percentile is denoted by 0005, and the portfolio contains the 99th to 100th percentile is denoted by 9900. This graph plots monthly excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas (positive values), and alphas with respect to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993) , and fourfactor model of Carhart (1997) . The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month during the sample period. This graph plots monthly excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas (negative values), and alphas with respect to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993) , and fourfactor model of Carhart (1997) . The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month during the sample period. This graph plots monthly excess returns of ten distress-sorted portfolios, and alphas with respect to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993) , and four-factor model of Carhart (1997) . The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month during the sample period.
